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With few exceptions, the coming of domestic satelhtes to Austraha 
has not yet engaged the attention of historians. The story began little 
more than a decade ago and it still unfolds as a significant issue in 
the political life of both the Commonwealth and the states. But 
where the phenomenon is so recent, the sources remain restricted, the 
actors are mostly reticent about their roles, and the historical 
profession is confronted by subjects of intimidating technical 
complexity, it is scarcely surprising that we await anything more than 
tantalisingly short narratives and manifestly tendentious ideological 
critiques. 
For anyone dependent, as most citizens are, on tabloid 
newspapers, popular magazines, and commercial television 
newscasts, the coming of the AUSSAT satellites may have seemed 
like a simple and heroic tale of technological progress and 
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entrepreneurial inhiative. From this point of view, the inevitable 
progress would have been swifter, if governments had had the 
wisdom and discretion to keep their own interference to the absolute 
minimum. The popular media — self interested in this matter as its 
proprietors were — gave some glimpses of dissent and debate but 
characteristicahy left the ordinary person unenlightened about 
events and issues which were the subject of intense speculation, 
controversy, and contumely. 
It is too early for the archival investigation and comprehensive 
assembly of oral testimony that wih be essential for definitive history. 
But it is by no means premature to begin, and to tentatively outline 
the contours of the first in a series of events which will continue to 
have considerable salience in all our lives over the coming decades. 
Let us start by listening to some voices that make a claim for the 
significance of the subject. First, Trevor Barr, author of a widely read 
Penguin Book, The Electronic Estate, and someone who is usually 
described as 'a well-known media commentator': 
As an exercise in communications policy, the introduction of the 
domestic-satellite system shows the monumental failure of the 
Australian political system to come to terms with complex issues 
related to technological change. 
"The political decision-making process which led to the introduction 
of Austraha's domestic satellite system," Barr tells us, "was 
essentially conducted behind closed doors, and between competing 
vested interests, with the ultimate decisions primarily made by 
technocrats'."' Another 'well-known media commentator ' , Ian 
Reinecke, and his cohaborator Julianne Schultz have pointed out 
that: 
For those able to penetrate the smokescreen of technical language, 
the decision-making process by which Australia came to acquire 
a satellite became a case study in how the private sector applied 
pressure on the Fraser government.^ 
It was in particular, in the opening phase, a case study in the influence 
of a single private indiviudal on the Australian political system. 
From the viewpoint of those who are interested in administrative 
behaviour — in the competence, style, and efficacy of our public 
servants — pohcy development for the satelhte project, has been 
depicted by Dominique Fisher, a student and AUSSAT policy officer 
who has had privileged access to documents and people, as "a 
bureaucratic nightmare".^ 
How then are we to try to understand this story? What is it a story 
about? 
In the first place it is very obviously an episode in the history of 
television in Australia — a subject which still implicitly beseeches the 
historical profession for the imprimatur of respectability. It is an 
episode that has been seen as a turning point in the development both 
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of basic national infrastructures and of the cultures and identities 
that are wedded, embedded, conceived, delivered, and nurtured 
within particular technological structures. A former private 
secretary to Labor's Minister for Communications wrote late last 
year: 
While Aussat (Australia's National Satellite System) has given 
Australia a $565 million state-of-the-art communications 
alternative, it has also turned the broadcasting industry on its head 
and is now threatening to do the same with telecommunications." 
Tom Burton was telling us that the satellites have cost us a lot of 
money and, by implication, had consequences exceeding those that 
were contemplated by the people who decided that we should have 
them. 
For Telecom's official historian, Mrs Ann Moyal, the decisions 
which resulted in the creation of an independent statutory company 
(AUSSAT) responsible for the operation of a domestic satellite 
system, were indeed "The first real threat to what had been seen as 
Telecom's 'unshakable monopoly' ".^  While the scale of investment 
entailed in pursuing a satellite option was only a small fraction even 
of Telecom's annual capital program, the introduction of an 
independent competitive telecommunications carrier would 
predictably accelerate the articulation of a deregulatory agenda for 
federal government policy. 
Here then are the barebones of a story of conflict and pohtical 
choice: a story involving as principals a media proprietor of immense 
wealth and determination, a statutory authority operating 
Australia's largest business enterprise with a monopoly on 
Australian telecommunications, the federal cabinet, powerful 
departments of state, and a host of other lesser players in the media, 
unions, and even academe. 
Some preliminary observations may give us a sense of proportion 
and perspective. 
It is scarcely novel to suggest that major political decisions are 
sometimes taken in secret, or that they are conditioned by peculiar 
and possibly reprehensible links between elements of big business 
and national governments which are charged with responsibility for 
the public interest. 
There is nothing new in saying that technocrats have exerted 
powerful influence over public policy decisions with which they are 
concerned. Nor will we be greatly surprised or greatly illuminated by 
the observation that the erosion of an enduring statutory 
telecommunications monopoly came to be pursued as a matter of 
policy by an Australian conservative government in the late 1970s. 
Nevertheless, while there may be familiar elements here, there is 
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much about the sequence of events and the precise nature of 
relationships uncovered that can enhance our perception of the 
nature of the Australian political environment. 
From the earliest days there were those who apprehended and were 
dismayed by the totemic force which even the thought of satellites 
seemed to summon. What makes the pre-history of Austraha's 
satellites worthy of investigation then is what it tells us about the 
reality of the public political process in the recent past. 
Much of the decision-making about the satellites appeared to be, 
and was officially said to be, at supposedly crucial phases, open to 
public participation and scrutiny. Critics of the process and 
advocates of a number of possible outcomes were often articulate but 
largely ineffectual. How was it that certain fundamental and in the 
event irreversible choices came to be made? 
TWO KEY PERSONALITIES 
In the opening paragraphs of every account by the contemporary 
chroniclers of the coming of the satellites, one name invariably 
appears — the name of one of Australia's richest men, Kerry Francis 
Bullmore Packer. 
"Kerry Packer," says Ms Alaine Chanter in a typical version, 
"launched Australia's satellite initiative by commissioning a report 
which argued in favour of a domestic satellite system."* The report 
was entitled "The Opportunity for Television Program Distribution 
in Australia Using Earth Satellites". Unsurprisingly it came to be 
called the Bond report after its author Donald S. Bond of RCA, the 
American communications giant. 
Bond's report evidently had what Ann Moyal was to describe as 
an "instant effect".^ It was presented to the Minister for Posts and 
Telecommunications, the Queensland Liberal Eric Robinson who in 
turn announced on 22 September 1977 that there would be a federal 
government task force to study the report and to examine its 
implications for the "structure, ownership and control of the 
Australian radio, television, and broadcasting industries".* 
Bond's document had, Ann Moyal suggested, "important allies" 
— or potential allies. At the beginning of 1977 the dominant world 
computer firm IBM, in partnership with Comsat and Aetna Life 
Insurance, had received the authority of the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission to proceed with an American 
communications satellite project. "The prospect of replicating that 
achievement brought IBM into the Australian fray", Moyal noted. 
And "Other lobbyists were also active. Accordingly," Moyal's 
account proceeds, "with cabinet approval, Robinson announced the 
appointment of a task force...'^ 
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'Accordingly"... how much is implied about the relationship 
between the Liberal-National government of Malcolm Fraser and 
Kerry Packer in this pregnant adverb? 
To the extent that sinister undertones may be read into these early 
analyses they may legitimately be traced to the fragments of 
anecdotal testimony so far volunteered by some of the participants 
themselves. For example, we have Mr Packer recalling the origins of 
his own interest in satellites in 1976 and a vital conversation with 
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. First, he reports a discussion with 
some of his own Television Corporation executives about their 
dependence on Telecom landlines to distribute their television signals 
around the country: 
They said "We need a communications satellite," and I looked 
blankly in their eyes and said "What do you mean by 
communications satellite?" and they started to talk about what 
happened in a country such as Canada. 
Excited by what he was told of the capacity of domestic satellites 
to bring television and radio and telephone services to distant 
communities in Canada and Alaska, Packer decided, so his accounts 
goes, to share his new knowledge with Malcom Fraser: 
And 1 went and saw the Prime Minister and 1 explained to him my 
understanding of what was happening in those areas, and to his 
undying credit he grasped on to it immediately and said "Of course, 
it's what we want. It's exactly the sort of thing we need to stop the 
drift of people into urban areas. We can keep them informed. We 
can allow them to participate in whatever's happening around the 
nation," and he said "can you do more for me on this?" and 1 said 
"It will take six or nine months. We will pay for it, then we will put 
to you a paper of how we see this developing".'" 
There are a number of intriguing revelations about this testimony. 
Are we really to believe that nearly a decade after OTC had 
i n a u g u r a t e d r egu la r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m e r c i a l sa te l l i te 
communications services out of Moree in N.S.W, the proprietor of 
TCN9 and GTV9 — two of the most advanced television stations in 
the world — needed to be told what a communications satelhte was? 
Perhaps." Certainly it is interesting that no reference was made to 
the fact that Malcolm Fraser had personal knowledge of Canadian 
satellites from a visit to Canada in 1976. 
Then we may notice what it was about communications satellites 
which supposedly the Prime Minister "grasped on t o " immediately. 
It was ironically the potential for satellites to assist in fulfiUing one 
of the major goals of the urban and regional programs of the former 
Whitlam government. Instead of dollar-consuming and politically 
vexatious policies of stimulating growth centres outside the major 
metropolitan areas, here was a genuine technological fix. Give the 
very remote citizen a telephone; give the less remote citizens more 
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television and radio; give them all a greater sense of belonging, and 
they will all be more likely to resist the dysfunctional seductiveness 
of the cities. Such was Fraser's thinking, at least as Packer 
understood it. 
In this first encounter there was a serious misunderstanding. That 
was not perhaps as puzzling as some might suppose if one remembers 
that the two men had little affinity by way of temperament or 
disposition. Fraser was concerned about outback communities. 
Packer had no compelling commercial interest in the communication 
needs of people beyond the range of existing earthbound television 
transmitters. He simply wanted a more efficient, and desirably less 
costly, way of gathering and distributing program material, and an 
extension of the market for the programs transmitted by his own 
television stations in Sydney and Melbourne. He especially wanted 
more television outlets in smaller towns and cities, not the scattered 
and commercially unappeahng communities of the remote outback. 
Misunderstanding or not, the most significant fact about the 
conversation was its agreed outcome. It was one thing for the Prime 
Minister and a buoyantly prosperous businessman to exchange ideas 
about recent technological developments and their social and 
economic ramifications. It was another for the Prime Minister to ask 
for a more extensive briefing from his informant. But to accept an 
offer to undertake and pay for a task that would last, as Packer said, 
six to nine months — was to enter into a rather different relationship. 
There could scarcely be any interpretation of such an arrangement 
that did not recognise the creation of some sort of reciprocal 
commitment or obligation. It might be difficult to define its extent; 
but harder to deny its existence. 
The government did after all have a Postal and 
Telecommunications Department with a pohcy responsibility for 
examining such matters. And, at precisely the same time, Telecom 
— the recently reborn operational telecommunications arin of the 
old Postmaster-General's Department — was well advanced with its 
own extended study of satellite technology. In fact, the widely 
publicised Telecom 2000 report completed in December 1975, 
supported "the case for an Australian domestic satellite system in the 
early 1980s". Admittedly the Telecom 2000 team had in mind video-
conferencing between capital cities, but it had acknowledged that "A 
satelhte will also provide solutions to rural communications 
problems".'2 
In a potentially far more radical conclusion, the government's own 
principal adviser on broadcasting and telecommunications, F.J. 
Green (Secretary of the Postal and Telecommunications 
Department) had reported to his Minister on 10 September 1976 that 
"although the introduction of a domestic satellite system offers 
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significant advantages in the field of broadcasting, such system 
would be of maximum use if it were to form the centre of the national 
telecommunications system."'^ 
It is unlikely that the Prime Minister would have digested in its 
entirety the 175 page Green report on Australian Broadcasting, or 
its 143 pages of appendices the very last of which listed broadcast 
satellites among issues for future consideration. But he was sure not 
to have missed a sensational story in The Australian on 21 March 
1977 which proclaimed that the federal government was studying a 
"revolutionary scheme" for the broadcast by satellite of radio and 
television programs "directly into every home in Austraha through 
a radar-type dish mounted on each roof". Quoting the head of the 
Department of Post and Telecommunications' Radio Frequency 
Management Division, Mr Jim Wilkinson, The Australian painted 
the bemusing prospect of "the abandonment of all existing color 
television sets and heavy expenditure on new equipment" for those 
who wanted to receive the services offered by this direct broadcasting 
satellite."' 
This was a story calculated to spread alarm throughout the 
television industry which was united in its opposition to direct 
broadcasting by satellite. Every television station proprietor in the 
country had something to lose if DBS competition were introduced. 
Predictably the government swiftly rebutted the article. "I am 
advised," Senator Carrick told the Senate the next day with his 
customary candour, "that it is not accurate to suggest that the 
Government is studying a scheme for the introduction of a domestic 
broadcasting satellite." What was true was that Austraha had been 
represented at a world conference in Geneva the previous month 
which had discussed such satellites, but it would be "some years 
before a definite proposal is put to the Government".'^ 
ADOPTING SATELLITE POLICY 
Plainly satellites were on the government's agenda when the Prime 
Minister decided to bypass the institutions that might have been 
expected to furnish him with information and instructive 
assessments. Fraser's invitation to Packer to "do more for me on 
this" signified a rejection of traditional sources of advice. It was— 
as soon as they were aware of it — a signal to the permanent head 
and other senior officers of Eric Robinson's ministry, to the Telecom 
board and management, and to the board and management of the 
Overseas Telecommunications Commission (OTC) that the ground 
rules for policy making in their domain had been changed. 
Mr Packer, we know, was as good as his word. He did commission 
a report. He did submit it to the government. And not long 
afterwards the government set up an inquiry of its own — a Task 
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Force chaired by Harold White, General Manager of the Overseas 
Telecommunications Commission. Mr White was a believer in 
satellites. 
Understandably, those inclined to a conspiratorial explanation of 
political developments have found the visible evidence of the Packer 
initiative and its immediate consequences congenial to their nascent 
theses. In a covering memorandum bearing the signature "Kerry 
Packer", Donald Bond's report was prefaced by two sentences the 
latter of which resonated with menace for the other established 
players in Australian broadcasting and telecommunications: 
The impact of a fully utilised domestic satellite system on the 
current Australian broadcasting and telecommunications 
arrangements will need to be carefully and fully studied. It might 
well mean a major revision of the television broadcasting frequency 
plan to accommodate additional re-broadcast transmitters, a 
reassessment of future terrestrial telecommunication systems, a 
change in the rights of Telecom as a common carrier expressed in 
the Telegraph Act [sic] and prospects of a more equitable tariff 
structure for these services.'* 
These sentences first appeared in publicly accessible form in an 
inspired feature article by Ian Moffitt in the edition of The Bulletin 
dated 8 October 1977.'^  An alert reader might have noticed at least 
three inadvertent disclosures in Moffitt's article. Anyone who cared 
to compare — as no one it seems has hitherto done — Eric 
Robinson's ministerial statement of September 22 with the words 
described in The Bulletin as Television Corporation's (not Packer's) 
preface to the Bond report, would have been struck by a curious 
coincidence immediately followed by an even more eloquent 
omission. The Minister in his speech had used a sequence of 33 words 
which echoed precisely the words of the Television Corporation (or 
Packer) preface. Robinson had said that the adoption of their 
proposal "might well mean a major revision of the television 
broadcasting frequency plan to accommodate additional 
rebroadcast transmitters. It could mean," he went on in this verbatim 
paraphrase, "a reassessment of future terrestrial telecommunication 
systems". And there the silent quotation ended, omitting the words 
about the impact on Telecom. However dependent he may have been 
on the Packer script for his lines, Eric Robinson was not yet ready 
to talk of "a change in the rights of Telecom as a common carrier". 
Nor could he be seen to endorse any suggestion that "a more 
equitable tariff structure" for Telecom's services might be warranted. 
If the phraseology of Robinson's statement indicated an 
exceptionally close rapport with the Packer proposal, its timing said 
even more. Bond's report was dated 15 August 1977. Robinson made 
his statement on September 22. Ian Moffitt's article, which must 
have been written in the last week of September, spoke of the Bond 
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report having been sent to Fred Green, the head of Robinson's 
department, "about three weeks ago". 
For those who knew the normal pace of bureaucratic 
consideration and preparation of advice, of ministerial dehberation, 
and cabinet decision-taking, the action was astonishing in its 
rapidity. As Senator John Button remarked when Eric Robinson's 
statement was presented to the Senate: 
It is sometimes said that anyone who blows in the ear of the 
Minister for Posts and Telecommunications gets a result. But one 
thing is quite certain: If Mr Kerry Packer of Australian 
Consolidated Press blows in the ear of the Minister he gets a very 
quick result. It leads of course to that old chestnut question which 
we often ask in the Senate about who in fact is running the country. 
In respect of broadcasting, is it Mr Eric Robinson the Minister for 
Post and Telecommunications, or is it Mr Packer of Consolidated 
Press? We have got an instant knee-jerk reaction.'* 
Of course it had not been an instant knee-jerk reaction. The 
September 22 announcement was the visible culmination of an 
unadvertised series of meetings and letters which had followed the 
initial Packer-Eraser agreement. Although Packer was to say later 
that the Prime Minister had been advised that six to nine months of 
study would be needed, the entire operation was carried through in 
three months. It was a text-book example of entrepreneurial drive. 
Here is how it seems to have happened.'^ 
Late in May, Packer's senior engineer adviser, Les Free, was 
packing his bags for North America where he was to study cable 
systems. A telephone call from his boss brought a surprise revision 
of his brief. "While you are there have a look at whether we can get 
a satelhte for Australia." 
As the former chief engineer of TCN in Sydney who had just been 
installed in an inner city office to run a small research and 
development group. Free needed no explanation of his employer's 
cryptic imperatives, or of the attractiveness of sateUites. In three 
weeks overseas he accumulated information from the best available 
sources. Returning to Australia, Free was delayed in Honolulu 
because of an air traffic controllers' strike. By coincidence. Packer 
and his senior publishing executive, Trevor Kennedy, were also in the 
Honolulu airport terminal. Thus it was that at 3 a.m. in the cocktail 
lounge of a Qantas jet thousands of metres over the Pacific Ocean, 
Kerry Packer learned about the latest satellite capabilities and 
decided to commission a report from an expert at RCA known to no-
one on his staff except by reputation. 
Eric Robinson was apprised of what was under way. In Brisbane 
on 23 May 1977, he had told the United Graziers Association that 
Austraha could have a domestic communications satelhte within ten 
years.20 This was the cautious conventional wisdom of the 
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telecommunications fraternity passed on by a Minister seemingly 
uncompromised as yet by knowledge of an imminent discontinuity 
in policy development. But in a speech opening a new 5 kilowatt 
transmitter for radio station 2LT Lithgow barely two months later 
on July 17, the Minister for Post and Telecommunications let slip 
some remarks that betrayed a new departure. Robinson's revelation 
was buried in the fourth column of the Lithgow Mercury's lovingly 
detailed account: 
Without giving too much away, Mr Robinson forecast that 
Australia was now on the threshold of a tremendous advancement 
in radio technology and predicted that before long not only would 
radio and television listeners and viewers be getting facts by 
satellite on the international link, but would be sharing in the 
advantages of domestic satellites. He predicted that his audience 
would soon see the Government making a decision regarding 
domestic satellites.2' 
They would indeed. Within two weeks. Packer had contacted Fred 
Green proposing a meeting. On August 2, departmental officials met 
Packer's representatives to discuss what were coyly described as 
"certain broadcasting engineering issues".^^ Six days later Packer 
wrote to the Prime Minister urging him to plan and implement a 
domestic satellite system. Fraser was informed of the creation of Les 
Free's research and development group and of the involvement of the 
American consultant Donald Bond. Bond's report apparently was 
completed on 15 August 1977. Four days later, an obviously well-
informed journalist on the Australian Financial Review— owned by 
Packer's rivals, the Fairfax family — broke the story that the 
Department of Post and Telecommunications was considering 
setting up a task force to evaluate the advantages of a domestic 
satellite system. Without mentioning the Packer initiative, the writer 
(Ken McGregor) noted that there had already been at least five years 
of official studies by Telecom, the Department of Defence, and the 
Department of the Northern Territory.^^ 
It was to be another six days before Packer himself, flanked by Les 
Free, and by Consolidated Press's veteran political writer and 
adviser, Alan Reid, met Fred Green with the two senior departmental 
engineers, Jim Wilkinson and Bill Beard. The Packer team presented 
fifteen copies of the Bond report. In answer to a question by Green 
about whether the report was only to go to members of the 
government. Packer responded that Green should hand them to 
whoever he wanted. "This", Packer said, "is not a political 
document." 
"Political" or not, the document did not get into the hands of 
Labor Opposition leaders for another five or six weeks. On 
September 14, Eric Robinson wrote to the Prime Minister reporting 
recent developments and putting the case for establishing a task force 
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to give the domestic satellite proposal careful consideration. 
Robinson sought the Prime Minister's approval for a group 
composed of representatives from Telecom, the ABC, OTC, and the 
Departments of Transport, Defence, Science, and Finance. The task 
force would be given six months to examine engineering, social, and 
economic issues. It was to be chaired by a senior engineer from the 
Minister's own department.2" 
With this letter, the project of an Austrahan domestic satellite 
passed from being a clandestine operation run by a major media 
proprietor and a handful of his corporate executives, and would now 
trigger the entire cross-linked and cumbersome machinery of the 
federal government. It did, however, get a head start. Bypassing the 
normal procedures of inter-departmental consultation and co-
ordination, Robinson's proposal was submitted directly to cabinet 
on September 22 and was approved subject to two important 
changes.25 
Whereas Robinson had reserved to himself the selection of a 
departmental officer to chair the inquiry, the chairman was now to 
be decided by the Prime Minister and the Minister. This 
demonstrated a reahsation at the highest levels that they were 
embarking on an exercise that transcended the interests of a single 
minister, and confirmed that Malcolm Fraser had no intention of 
losing control of a venture he had personally initiated. With the 
ultimate choice of Harold White of OTC, Fraser ensured that any 
disposition in Robinson's department to protect Telecom would have 
minimal effect. 
The second change was the exclusion of broadcasting interests— 
whether the ABC, or Packer's Television Corporation (or his 
consultant Mr Bond), or any other broadcaster — from 
membership. 
When Eric Robinson went into the House of Representatives after 
dinner on September 22 to announce cabinet's decision, few in the 
chamber reahsed that the Parliament had only six weeks to run. But 
the political context which helped to explain the urgency with which 
the matter was pushed through was Malcolm Fraser's decision to 
hold a general election in December 1977, a full year before it was 
due. Satellites, Fraser believed, were vote winners. 
THE NEXT PHASE 
Until 22 September 1977, the satellite proponents outside the 
government had the initiative. They had enjoyed the Prime 
Minister's favour, and benefited from a willingness to minimise and 
retard the intervention of ministers and public servants. That 
Packer's enterprise had gone so far so quickly was such a gratifying 
achievement that it may well have clouded his judgement about how 
far he was from getting what he wanted. He had substantially under-
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estimated the resources, skih, and persistence of those in Canberra 
and elsewhere whose authority was undermined by his success. He 
had, moreover, failed to recognise the incapacity of even the most 
complaisant political leaders to resolve by acts of will, enormously 
complex conflicts of interest. The truth was that the institutional 
arrangements and legislative framework of the Australian 
broadcasting and telecommunications industries embodied carefully 
crafted, historically seasoned, and politically delicate compromises. 
No matter how Packer or Eric Robinson dressed it up. Packer's plan 
represented a real threat not only to Telecom's position as the 
nation's statutory monopoly telecommunications carrier if Telecom 
did not control the satellites — but also to the dozens of comfortably 
profitable regional monopoly television companies which flourished 
under the prevailing bipartisan government policy, protected against 
metropolitan dominance.^^ And as a Labor spokesman delightedly 
pointed out when the government was slow to release the Bond 
report: "Not only the Packer Press but also the Fairfaxes, the 
Murdochs and the Ansetts will be interested in this matter.""! want 
to know", Mr Charles Jones intimated, "whether it is proposed that 
other commercial television channels will have access to it [the 
sateUite] or whether only the Packer Press will be associated with 
it."27 This was one question which was quickly disposed of as soon 
as the report was publicly available. 
Kerry Packer had not imagined that he could secure government 
support for a large competitive advantage over his main rivals. On 
the contrary, the scheme submitted over Donald Bond's signature, 
was one which endowed all three of the so-called networks — those 
groups which effectively controlled stations in both Sydney and 
Melbourne and through them influenced a greater number of 
stations elsewhere. The scheme explicitly extended the access of the 
networks to the rest of the community. 
What Packer had proposed was a plan to accelerate a trend that 
was already occurring as a result of market forces. Although 
government policy had limited individuals to the ownership of only 
two television stations, it was inevitable that the owners of television 
stations in the nation's two biggest cities would have overwhelming 
leverage over the lesser operators. The Melbourne and Sydney 
stations bought, commissioned, and produced the majority of what 
eventually appeared on regional screens. The problem for the major 
players was that there were not enought regional outlets for their 
programs. If there was only one station in a country town — and 
there were three networks trying to sell programs — 3 into 1 didn't 
go nearly as profitably as 1 into 3. The Bond plan therefore envisaged 
a satellite service that would "distribute four television programs 
simultaneously to 90 communities throughout Australia" — in effect 
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all the places the ABC already reached and a few more. The four 
programs would originate from the big three east coast commercial 
opeators and the ABC. The ultimate objective, as expressed in the 
covering memorandum, was that "television services should be 
provided to areas not at present served and that all four Australian 
networks should reach all the nation's citizens''.^* 
Unashamedly self-interested as this proposal was, it did not entail 
exclusive satellite access for Packer. As his plan was refined during 
the Task Force's deliberations it became clear that the strategy was 
for the three main players to share a newly expanded market in a way 
that precluded the growth of minor operators or the entry of new 
players into the market.^^ 
Packer was flexible over precisely how these aims might be 
achieved. But to his dismay, his prescription did not prove to be as 
self evidently attractive to his competitors as he had hoped. Five 
years later, the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal noted that: 
The evidence submitted to the Task Force showed that the proposal 
did not have universal support among its intended beneficiaries. 
Companies in the Ten Network were generally disposed to view the 
idea with favour, but companies in the Seven Network remained 
convinced that it offered no economic advantages in the short term 
to offset its substantial additional costs.3" 
BUREAUCRACY REASSERTED 
It was to take a decade for successive federal governments to finally 
settle on a policy, legal, and regulatory framework that would re-
estabhsh equihbrium in the television industry — an industry whose 
stability was so fundamentally shaken by the perceived threat and 
promise of satellite broadcasting. And when at last arrangements 
looked to be in place under the government's equahsation scheme, 
the Remote Commercial Television Services plan, and the 
foreshadowed ownership and control liberalisation — arrangements 
which for practical purposes achieved what the original Packer plan 
had sought — it was a supreme irony that Mr Packer chose that 
moment to realise the massively enhanced value of his electronic 
media empire and sell it to one of the new players whose growth he 
had previously tried so hard to contain. The Packer empire became 
the Alan Bond empire. 
Ten years of wrangling, an exhausting sequence of government 
inquiries with concurrent major inquiries by the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal on cable and subscription television and 
satellite program services, and a departmental inquiry into localism, 
and further reports on TV equalisation, not forgetting the Davidson 
inquiry on telecommunications... all had taken their toh on all of the 
players. But one group — dedicated, durable, and daring — held the 
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field. From the day they seized control of the project in September 
1977, the communications bureaucrats had done well what they do 
best — they made policy by attrition.They had understood that there 
was enough political will to ensure that a satellite system would be 
approved. They reahsed too that the momentum of the project could 
be maintained by separating technological decisions from decisions 
about broadcasting and telecommunications policy. If they could get 
the birds to fly, the government would sooner or later have to make 
decisions about who could use them and what they would be 
permitted to do. By providing unchallengable recommendations 
about particular capabilities on the satellites themselves — specific 
power, beam shape, switching options, and so on — the bureaucrats 
in collaboration with the engineers could also to a considerable 
extent determine the choices which eventuahy would be available to 
government. 
-From late 1977 onwards, not only Kerry Packer but the entire 
broadcasting industry found itself engaged in a wearying succession 
of consultations and debates, submissions and responses. For a short 
time, the fiction was maintained that the question whether there 
would be a satellite system was still to be settled. As late as 18 October 
1979, Mr Tony Staley (who had replaced Eric Robinson as Minister 
for Post and Telecommunications in December 1977), was telling the 
House of Representatives that "Nothing could be gained by now 
delaying a decision in principle".^' Staley himself has always believed 
that his personal support was a vital factor in ensuring that a final 
decision in favour of satellites was made.32 What was never put to the 
test was whether Staley could have halted the project if he had been 
convinced he should. 
Looking back in November 1985 on the way in which Packer's 
package — or at least a frequently modified version of it — had 
developed an irresistible momentum, Ian Reinecke speculated that 
there had been perhaps three occasions when the consensus building 
and implementation processes might have been brought to a halt.^^ 
The first had been when the White Task Force -report was 
published in September 1978 and it became clear from a dissenting 
statement by the Department of Finance representative that there 
were severe doubts about the financial viability of the project. But, 
with that inexorably imposed certitude with which Canberra 
extinguishes inconvenient misgivings, it was to become an article of 
faith that the system would eventually pay for itself.3'' The second 
occasion was after the subsequent inter-departmental working group 
had failed to reach agreement. The Department of Finance wanted 
a decision on the satellite system deferred, and urged that if it went 
ahead it "might be better implemented by a largely autonomous 
subsidiary of Telecom than by a separate authority".35 The majority 
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of the inter-departmental group — like the Task Force before them 
— had recommended the creation of a National Satellite 
Commission. But the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
proposed instead the setting up of an Interim Satehite Planning 
Office. The judgment of the Prime Minister's own departmental 
representatives then was that "the conclusions of the report 
concerning the levels of demand, costs and financial viability of a 
satellite system suggest the need for caution".^^ 
If Malcolm Fraser's public service advisers were lukewarm, and 
Eric Robinson, now the Minister for Finance, could allow his 
officers to express reservations, it appeared something of a triumph 
for Tony Staley and his new department head, the resurrected Bob 
Lansdown, to keep the project moving ahead. 
A final chance to say 'no' came with the change of government in 
1983. The new Labor Minister for Communications Michael Duffy 
did think about it — urged to do so by the strident ATEA — but was 
quickly diverted from the issue of principle to matters of detail. His 
top advisers were strong believers in continuity of policy. "It would 
have required," says Reinecke, "an act of great pohtical courage to 
follow the path that rationality demanded and say no to the satellite. 
But successive governments appear barely to have begun to 
understand how previous choices on apparently technical matters 
had locked them in. As the project proceeded, the political risks in 
exercising the option to stop had escalated."" 
Reinecke is right about the political courage that was needed. But 
the flaw in this analysis is the assumption that only one policy could 
properly be regarded as rational. The very heart of the problem of 
political choice is not just that there is never universal agreement 
about what should be done, but that even what constitutes a proper 
reason for action is contentious. 
It may well be true that what Malcolm Fraser and Eric Robinson 
were encouraging could not be justified on particular cost-benefit 
grounds. Yet even Telecom, which had concluded in November 1977 
that a satelhte was uneconomic, was itself prepared to concede that 
a case might be made in terms of some more broadly defined 
"national advantage" or "priority", s^ In fact, a draft of Telecom's 
report prepared for the White Task Force in the spring of 1977, 
actually expressed support for a satelhte system as part of Telecom's 
own telecommunications infrastructure. There were, it was 
admitted, social and perhaps long term international reasons that 
counterbalanced purely commercial calculations.^^ 
It was an error of judgment — at least from Telecom's point of view 
— to change the emphasis of its final report and thereafter to adopt 
a consistently critical and detached stance. By making no secret of 
its opposition to the satellite, Telecom disqualified itself both as a 
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source of objective advice and as a body to be entrusted with the 
project. Tony Staley has testified that he "seriously entertained the 
idea of having Telecom take total control", but he was so 
disappointed with the unimaginative response that he got from the 
Managing Director, Jack Curtis, that he opted instead for the 
creafion of what turned out to be a government owned company.'*o 
Given the climate of dissatisfaction among influential business 
customers of Telecom, and the growing impatience in Canberra and 
elsewhere with the militancy of the Telecom unions, Telecom's best 
strategy would have been to seize the running of satellites as soon as 
it became obvious that the Prime Minister was being tempted. As it 
happened, Kerry Packer's original motivation was focussed entirely 
on his television interests. He had been annoyed by the impediments 
to marketing his cricket spectacular telecasts around the country 
bepause of inadequacies in the available, and costly, Telecom 
facihties. His Consolidated Press Holdings was experiencing a 
gratifying surge of profitability that could finance expansive 
ambitions. He was not at first interested in breaking Telecom's 
telecommunications monopoly; and it was only later that he became 
involved with IBM and others in the Business Telecommunications 
Services consortium which explicitly set out to sell the concept of 
deregulation. All Packer wanted originally was to shake Telecom into 
being more responsive to his needs.•*• If Telecom had grasped the 
initiative it would have been better placed to control the pace and 
direction of a project which many of its most senior staff privately 
favoured. 
AN ASSESSMENT 
Was the coming of the satellites then a triumph for Kerry Packer? 
Many thought so, and some were affronted, when during the Task 
Force hearings in 1978 Harold White pre-empted the inquiry and 
openly told Packer: "We'll get a satellite, the only issues are when, 
what design, who controls it, how much it's going to cost, who pays 
for it all etc..."'*2 But the issues of when it would operate, what its 
capabilities would be, who controlled, financed, and paid for it, were 
also of interest to Packer. On all of these matters, especially on its 
use. Packer had to endure a series of rebuffs before the Hawke 
government finaUy constructed a commercial television industry 
pohcy that satisfied the basic network desire for larger markets. 
So frustrated had Packer become by the last months of the Fraser 
ministry that he put on record the judgment that from the time he 
had handed over the Bond report 
every government department and busybody and group of people 
who had absolutely no comprehension of what was going on were 
dedicated to the destruction of the scheme... the misuse, the 
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stupidity with which the government departments have handled the 
communications satellite is terrifying."^ 
Curiously, at the same time, the inner circle of administrators in 
what had now become the Department of Communications were 
equally convinced that their own efforts were to little avail. With 
consummate opportunism the pubhc servants steered the enterprise 
forward, demonstrating their impartiality by irritating almost 
everyone without fear or favour, while fostering an illusory process 
of wide consultation. Anyone could make an input but the 
department controlled the output. The bureaucrats drew their 
strength from the original prime ministerial impetus, from the energy 
and convictions of Tony Staley, from the fortuitous advantage they 
gained in having two necessarily under-informed coalition ministers 
in rapid succession after Staley's retirement, from the widespread 
ignorance and indifference of most federal parliamentarians, from 
the natural excitement and commitment of the OTC engineers who 
were the core of the project team, from the growing numbers of 
would-be satellite users, and from their own understandable, if not 
quite admitted, desire to be associated with what could be seen as 
a turning point in the nation's history. 
Sustaining all of the players, with varying degrees of sincerity, was 
a belief, both comforting and inspiring, that by nurturing a major 
technological development they would be serving significant social 
purposes. As Staley was later to put it: 
we designed a point to multi-point satellite for applications in 
which satellite is the only solution, or the most cost-effective 
solution, or the only ideal solution: broadcasting, air navigation, 
high speed data and voice networks in situations where Telecom 
cannot always or cannot quickly provide the required data rate; 
remote communications, video-conferencing networks, and, 
diversity, reliability and quality.*" 
But there was a more ennobhng vision upon which Donald Bond 
had perceptively grounded his case from the very beginning. "All 
citizens of Australia," Bond had said, "should have equal 
opportunity to receive a diversity of television programs for 
entertainment, information, education, and cultural enrichment. 
This goal implies a choice of several programs broadcast 
simultaneously, with full availability in remote rural areas just as in 
major cities."^ Bond quoted from the Green report on Australian 
Broadcasting a sentence which the Packer forces henceforth 
proclaimed quite without any evident sign of embarrassment, as the 
basic objective of their plan: "An Australian national identity should 
be fostered, and programs should enrich the social, cultural and 
moral values of the Australian people."'^^ 
No matter how devastingly Labor's John Button, or Myles Wright 
(the former Chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Control 
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Board) or other informed critics were to expose the hypocrisy of 
masking the wider dissemination of capital city television programs 
as social, cultural or moral enrichment, there was no denying that 
these programs were popular. There was indisputably a market for 
what Paul Keating was later to cynically label "slop" — not just one 
but three pales of metropolitan slop. Sober assessments of the 
improbability of many remote individuals or groups even being able 
to afford the receiving equipment — or for that matter of any viable 
scheme for providing commercial television services to remote 
Australia being devised — such unwelcome thoughts were enveloped 
in clouds of self-serving optimism from public servants whose 
reputations were at stake and from businessmen and women hopeful 
of turning quick dollars in a high-tech market they imagined could 
be created by government fiat. 
But for an idealist like Tony Staley, or for a pragmatist reliant on 
count ry votes like Staley 's successor as Minis ter for 
Communications, Ian Sinclair, the satelhte argument could be 
elevated to a higher level. Staley declared in announcing the 
government's commitment: 
One of the most moving experiences in my public life has been to 
see the astonishment and delight of people from remote areas when 
they realise what a domestic satellite can mean to them and their 
families. This decision will, in a very real sense, help to dispel the 
distance — mental as well as geographical — between urban and 
regional dwellers, between the haves and the have nots in a 
communication society It gives us the opportunity to make a 
supreme effort of will to use the latest available communications 
technology to weld our scattered population into one nation; to 
foster a sense of unity that will make us a great nation."' 
The reality no doubt must always fall short of the dream. But 
perhaps the dream — however naive, however rhetorically 
embellished, however exploited — at least serves to preserve us from 
the unqualified legitimation of self-interest. 
Privately, Tony Staley saw satellites less as a way of bringing the 
city and the bush closer together than as the vehicles for a new wave 
of democratised media access. "No longer," he was- to proclaim 
retrospectively, "need the television medium be the exclusive 
province of the rich and the powerful.""^ 
That too was a noble, if premature and unrealistic, aspiration. But 
for all the scepticism about motive which it is prudent to have in a 
democratic polity, we can happily acknowledge that there were some 
among those in authority who saw that satellites had a potential for 
social benefit as well as for commercial exploitation. We should 
salute their insight and dedication, and resolve to strengthen the arm 
of their inheritors before the opportunity is lost forever.''^ 
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